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A Framework for Evaluating Non-Tariff Barriers 
to Trade Related to Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Regulation 
Neal H. Hooker and Julie A. Caswell 
nder recent trade agreements, a two part science and policy test is used to maluate whether 
a country 3 sanitary or phytosanitary regulatory regimes constitute illegitimate non-tanfl U barriers to trade. We @sent a jramework for operationalising this test, focusing on how 
the SPS regime affects trade flows through differences in compliance costs, which in turn d q a d  on 
the level of regulatory rapprochement between trading partners. 
1. Introduction 
The sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) attributes of agricultural and food products pose 
unique problems and considerations in trade facilitation and management. They are 
heavily regulated by governments as a means of correcting market imperfections and 
Eailures. However, diverse national-level] regulations may impede international trade either 
intentionally or unintentionally as a means of protecting domestic markets. Trade 
agreements signed in the 199Os, including the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) and the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
now managed by the World Trade Organisation ( W O ) ,  set criteria to evaluate SPS policy; 
encourage co-operation among countries in policy development; and provide a mechanism 
for resolution of disputes. The intention is to prevent SPS regulation fiom being used as a 
substitute for more traditional trade intervention tools such as ta r i f f s  and quotas. 
Many analysts have noted that SPS regulations are unique among tariff and non-tariff 
barriers to trade (NTBs) in that they often have legitimate motivations, complicating the 
analysis of their trade flow and welfare impacts. To date surprisingly little formal research 
exists that addresses this analysis. Our purpose is to outline a framework for evaluating 
the impacts of SPS regulations within this new trade environment. 
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Regulations may also be initiated or implemented on the trading bloc level. Here "national-level" includes 
trading bloc regulations. 
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Sanitary and phytosanitary regulations are a subset of the larger class of administrative 
barriers to trade. These have been usefully defined by Roberts and DeRemer as 
"internationally divergent regulations and standards governing the sale of products in 
national markets which have as their prima-facie objective the correction of market 
inefficiencies stemming from externalities associated with the production, distribution, 
and consumption of these products" (Roberts and DeRemer, 1997, p. 1). Sanitary and 
phytosanitary (SPS) regulations are measures intended to protect human, plant, and 
animal health, while other measures that affect the quality of agricultural and food 
products are referred to as technical barriers.' The Uruguay Round of GATT includes 
separate SPS and Technical Barriers Agreements. 
SPS measures are distinguished by their agricultural and food safety targets. Food safety 
targets, for example, include foodborne pathogens, pesticide and veterinary residues, 
food additives, and naturally occurring toxins. In national-level regulation, measures that 
target safety coexist and are often co-mingled with measures aimed at other quality 
targets. For example, for food products a single set of regulations may co-mingle controls 
over food safety, compositional integrity (purity), and process attributes. The impact of 
SPS measures depends on the quality targets (attributes); the regulatory regime (e.g., 
input, process, or product performance standards) chosen to achieve the targets; and 
the degree of co-operation between countries in setting and communicating policy. 
The degree of co-operation between countries in setting policy is an important 
component in analysing the impact of SPS regulation on trade flows and welfare. This 
level of cooperation is referred to as the level of regulatory rapprochement. Following 
Jacobs (1994), the strategies for rapprochement include: 
(i) Harmonisation: standardisation of regulations in iden tical form. 
(ii) Mutual Recognition: acceptance of regulatory diversity as meeting common goals 
(sometimes called reciprocity or equivalency). 
(iii) Co-ordination: gradual narrowing of relevant differences between regulatory 
systems, often based on voluntary international codes of practice (sometimes called 
alignment), 
These rapprochement levels range along a spectrum from weak (no rapprochement or 
simple coordination) to stronger (mutual recognition) to strongest (harmonisation) 
(Caswell and Hooker, 1996). The GATT SPS Agreement focuses on one avenue to 
harmonisation in Article 3 where it encourages countries to adopt internationally 
recognised standards, guidelines and recommendations. Article 4 in turn discusses 
equivalence suggesting a format for how nations should evaluate non-identical SPS 
regulatory regimes. 
' Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) regulations (i) protect animal or plant life or health within a territory from 
risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease carrying organisms, or disease 
causing organisms, (ii) protect human or animal life or health within a territory from risks arising from 
additives, contaminants, toxins, or disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages, or feedstuffs, (iii) protect 
human l ie  or health within a territory from risks arising from diseases carried by animals, plants, or products 
thereof, or from entry, establishment or spread of pesu, or (iv) prevent or h i t  other damage within a territory 
from the entry, establishment, or spread of pests (GATT SPS, 1994, Annex A). 
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2. Science and Policy Tests for SPS Measures as NTBs 
The overall approach for evaluating NTBs arising from SPS regulations is set out by 
recent trade agreements. This approach is relatively complex because SPS measures, like 
certain environmental regimes, frequently have positive (welfare enhancing) impacts 
that may offset any negative (welfare decreasing) impacts resulting from trade 
restriction. The language of the GATT SPS Agreement is clear on how this analysis 
should progress, providing an overall structure for evaluating SPS regimes for their 
scientific merit, welfare, and trade impacts. The SPS language in NAFTA is similar. The 
GATT SPS Agreement provides a formal ‘quasi-judicial’ set of binding rules for 
settlement of disputes (Abbott, 1997). The first element in a detailed framework for 
evaluating SPS NTBs is a two level analysis of science and policy based on the 
agreements’ language to be used in assessing the trade impacts of national-level 
regulations and in dispute settlement. 
The main tenants of the GATT SPS Agreement highlight the two level process. The 
intent of GATT, and now the WTO, is to promote the free exchange of goods (and 
services) where such trade is based upon comparative advantage. National treatment 
provisions, for example, commit countries to apply the same rules to both imported and 
domestic products. These rules are intended to prevent the use of industrial policies 
designed to confer a competitive advantage on domestic goods at the expense of foreign 
produced goods. However, the SPS Agreement does not affect a nation’s basic right to 
select the level of risk protection it believes is appropriate. Instead, should a country 
choose a regime stricter than relevant internationally recognized standards, it must, if 
challenged, defend its regime by presenting a risk analysis that defines the risk and the 
need for its tighter control.1 
The GATT SPS Agreement is quite clear in stating that the risk analysis, which combines 
elements of both the science and policy levels, should contain three parts. First is risk 
assessment which should defend a nation’s decision regarding the appropriate level of 
protection, thus providing a scientific basis for all SPS regimes (Article 5) .  Second is risk 
management which is defined as “the process of weighing policy alternatives in the light 
of results of the risk assessment and, if required, selecting and implementing appropriate 
control options, including regulatory measures” (Codex, 1996), elements of which are 
discussed in Articles 3, 5, and 6. Third is risk communication among trading partners 
which involves both the transparency requirement that other countries be notified about 
the controls (Article 7 and as elaborated in Annex B of the GATT SPS Agreement) and 
the more general need for signatory nations to openly exchange research and 
communicate in international fora. These fora include the Codex Alimentanus 
Commission (Codex); the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) and its 
regional affiliates (e.g., the North American Plant Protection Organization (NAPPO)); 
and the International Office of Epizootics (OIE). The latter communication is intended 
to strengthen rapprochement efforts among countries on the science level. 
The GATTSPSAgreement uses an older definition of the term risk assessment, which includes “...the 
associated potential biological and economic consequences“ of a regime (GATT-SPS 1994. Annex A). Codex, 
for example, has since adopted a ‘harmonised’ definition of risk analysis (i.e., including risk assessment, 
management, and communication) which better distinguishes between the science and policy levels. 
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The GATT also articulates an additional policy test for SPS regulations. It binds 
Members to consider all “relevant economic factors” in determining their appropriate 
level of protection (risk). These factors include: 
the potential damage in terms of loss of production or sales in the event of the entry, 
establishment, or spread of a pest or disease; the costs of control or eradication in 
the territory of the importing Member; and the relative cost effectiveness of 
alternative approaches to limiting risks (GATTSPS 1994, Article 5(3)). 
The SPS Agreement also states the goal of “minimising negative trade effects.” This 
latter idea, often referred to as ‘proportionality’, is restated as “Members shall ensure 
that such measures are not more trade restrictive than required to achieve their 
appropriate level of protection, taking into account technical and economic feasibility” 
(GATT-SPS 1994, Article 5(6)). Footnote 3 states that “a measure is not more trade 
restrictive than required unless there is another measure, reasonably available taking 
into account technical and economic feasibility, that achieves the appropriate level of 
protection and is significantly less restrictive to trade.” 
This focus on risk analysis is an effort to both encourage consistency in the choice of 
the appropriate level of protection provided by a SPS measure and to identify those 
regimes that differ significantly across nations and may impede trade. In this way, the 
agreement attempts to evaluate SPS NTBs in a coherent manner. It is important to note 
that when a country selects a more restrictive standard and is challenged, the burden of 
proving compliance with the SPS Agreement is on the importing country. In contrast, 
the burden of proving the equivalency of different countries’ regimes and their adequacy 
in controlling risks is placed on the exporting country. This distinction is key in disputes, 
although the format and process is equivalent in either case. 
This framework can be characterised in a flow chart (Figure 1, adapted from Phumpiu 
and Temel 1995) where the sequence of evaluation of a SPS regulatory regime 
progresses from the science to the policy level tests. Essentially, two main and one follow- 
up questions are posed. Is the SPS regime based on an internationally accepted standard 
(and as such has it been implemented in a manner that maintains the spirit of the 
standard)? Failing this, has the country supplied a valid risk analysis to defend its 
selection of the regulatory regime? Finally, are the trade impacts of the regime 
proportional to the objective of the regime (i.e., have alternative methods of 
implementation and their trade effects been considered)? The ordering of the two levels 
is important, as a risk assessment (science level) needs to lead any policy discussion and 
selection among risk management and communication strategies. However, a dispute 
over an SPS NTB can arise at either level making a holistic analysis of the science and 
policy components necessary. 
Earlier approaches to evaluating SPS regimes as NTBs can be rethought using the basic 
structure of Figure 1. For example, Phumpiu and Temel, following work by Kinsey 
(1993), argued for a dual categorisation of NTBs. Advertent Type I barriers arise from 
quotas, embargoes, antidumping duties, and countervailing charges, which act on 
import quantities and/or the price/cost relationship between domestic and foreign 
goods (Kinsey, 1993). 
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Inadvertent Type I1 barriers arise from less traditional trade interventions, although 
they have nearly identical effects. Key among these inadvertent or incidental and less 
transparent interventions are health, safety, and labelling regulations. This classification 
groups all nontraditional interventions implying they have identical effects and are 
innocent attempts to regulate the domestic food supply. However, in evaluating SPS 
NTBs, the advertent/inadvertent distinction very frequently cannot be operationalised 
because it is impossible to determine the motivation behind a regulatory regime. More 
importantly, recent trade agreements do not consider whether barriers caused by a 
regime are advertent or inadvertent. Rather, the actual effect on trade is what matters. 
In this framework, the science test focuses on whether a particular regulatory regime is 
based on currently available scientific knowledge. The protection goal, standard, and 
regulatory regime adopted can be compared to current international standards. Recent 
multilateral agreements establish international standards promulgated by Codex, OIE, 
and IPPC as the preeminent basis of this comparison and evaluation. 
The role of the policy level analysis is then to determine if the regime is legitimate or 
illegitimate based on its relative trade impacts. It is at this level that the role of economics 
emerges, with the policy test being suggestive of evaluating the welfare effects of an SPS 
regime. The evaluation of the nature and extent of the potential NTB requires analysis 
of the trade flow impact. According to the agreement, a regime should be chosen to have 
the lowest trade impact practicable (proportionality). Unlike the science level test, the 
agreement gives relatively little guidance for the policy test, particularly regarding how 
to evaluate alternative risk management strategies. Given the expense of disputes and 
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their associated risk assessments, the policy test is likely to only be applied to SPS regimes 
with major trade impacts. Thus economic and trade significance are key in determining 
which SPS regimes are scrutinised and attacked as illegitimate NTBs. Similarly, only 
regulatory regimes with significant economic impacts are likely to be the focus of 
regulatory rapprochement efforts between countries. 
The policy test is intended to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate NTBs. A 
particular SPS regime may affect trade but not be an illegitimate NTB. For example, a 
new food safety regulation may lead to a decline in or end to trade from one or more 
countries. An inspection of the trade data could suggest cause for concern. However, the 
existence of trade impacts is not conclusive evidence of an illegitimate NTB under recent 
agreements. It would be so only if it failed the science or policy tests. Further, the 
classification of an SPS regulation as an illegitimate NTB may not indicate the existence 
of a trade dispute. A dispute may not be forthcoming because the trade affected is 
economically unimportant; from countries with insufficient resources to bring disputes; 
or from parties that do not want to risk possible retaliation. Recent cases such as the beef 
hormone dispute between the European Union and the United States and Canada 
illustrate the application of the science and poIicy tests (Hooker, 1998; Roberts, 1998). 
3. A Further Examination of the Policy Test 
Economic factors play a major role in the functioning of the policy test for evaluating SPS 
regimes as NTBs. Prior to the new SPS agreements, governments considering adoption 
of SPS regimes could focus almost exclusively on domestic benefits and costs. Potential 
trade impacts were important only if the product was a significant source of export 
revenue or imports were relied upon to supply a domestic shortfall. The new trade 
environment requires more advanced international analysis. Countries now know their 
choice of regulatory regimes will be scrutinised as to whether they address legitimate risk 
reduction or control goals with a minimised trade impact. 
How the policy test should be carried out is not clearly operationalised in the SPS 
agreements. One approach is to focus on the incidence of costs and benefits within and 
outside the country instituting the regulation. Caswell and Kleinschmit (1997) applied 
this approach to analyse federal-state regulatory disputes within the United States. Their 
work suggests when federal pre-emption of state-level regulations is appropriate based on 
measures of a regulatory regime’s spillover. This approach could be adapted for 
evaluation of the international trade impacts of SPS NTBs for the nation imposing the 
regime and its trading partners. The criteria for minimum trade impact could focus on 
the maximum absolute spillover allowed; allowing no negative spillover; allowing no 
disproportionate spillover; or a ceiling on the permissible share of spillover. 
An international spillover technique is an advanced form of policy analysis. Consider a 
policy with a potentially large trade impact such as the requirement by the Food Safety 
and Inspection Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture that Hazard Analysis and 
Critical Control Points (HACCP) programmes be implemented in the meat and poultry 
industry (USDA, 1996). The rule making process allowed for some discussion of the 
international incidence of compliance costs but said nothing about the benefits accruing 
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externally. Similarly “the portion of the increased costs that are expected to be passed on 
to US consumers by foreign processors (FDA, 1995, p. 65191)” were included in the 
analysis of the US Food and Drug Administration’s seafood HACCP rule. However, no 
overall spillover-based analysis of trade impacts was done in either case. In practice, such 
tests are too ambitious to be implemented in the international trade context. 
We propose an alternative policy test that focuses on differences in compliance costs 
experienced by domestic and foreign suppliers as the result of the SPS regulatory 
regime. Any additional costs incurred by foreign suppliers to be in compliance with more 
restrictive national-level SPS regulations are an important economic indicator of the 
regime’s trade impacts. These compliance costs are a major component of trade 
transaction costs for SPS regimes (Ndayisenga and Kinsey, 1994). Further, as developed 
below, an asymmetric cost increase for foreign suppliers can be a necessary condition for 
a domestic welfare loss due to an NTB arising from SPS regulation (Hillman, 1991). 
Analysis of asymmetric compliance costs benefits from use of the classic comparison 
between the welfare impacts of tariffs versus quotas. The two policy alternatives are 
illustrated in Figure 2 for a standard, perfectly competitive, partial equilibrium model 
with infinitely elastic foreign (and, in this Scountry model, world) supply at price P, (Sf 
= MCf). The resultant supply curve is the combination of S, for quantities greater than 
x1 and the domestic supply function (Sd) for quantities less than xl. Without 
intervention, the equilibrium price is P,, the intersection of the supply and domestic 
figure 2 Welfare Costs of SPS hTB with Perfectiy Competitive Markets 
Price 
P W 
4 
X 3 X 2 
X 
1 
0 X Quantity 
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demand (Dd) functions. Total demand is x4 of which ~ 1 x 4  is imported and ox1 is 
domestically produced. Now consider the effect of a tariff that increases foreign costs 
asymmetrically and causes a resultant price of pr = (1 t t)pw Total demand falls to x3 with 
a decline in imports to ~ 2 x 3  and a rise in domestic production to 0x2. The loss in 
(domestic) consumer surplus is the area P,.abpw of which Pwefpr is captured by domestic 
firms as producer surplus. Further the shaded area acdf is raised as tariff revenue. The 
overall welfare loss is the combined triangular areas abc+def (Hillman, 1991). 
Conversely, consider the effect of a quota that leads to the same level of imports ~2x3, 
increasing domestic output to 0x2 and reducing total demand to x3 as the price rises to 
pr. Now the area acdf represents a rent for foreign producers if they receive a premium 
above their marginal cost. However, given a perfectly competitive auction of the quota 
rights, the domestic government can capture these rents making the welfare effect of the 
quota identical to that of the tariff. Thus the result that the two policy tools are 
equivalent for an equally restricted quantity and no quality change. 
Once nontraditional forms of intervention such as SPS regulations are considered the 
analysis shifts. If the SPS regulation asymmetrically increases the compliance and trade 
transaction costs of foreign companies, it will have a tariffication effect (t) but no tariff 
revenues are collected by government.’ A reduction in imports due to the cost effect 
occurs with a resultant reduction in consumer surplus by the same area as with a tariff of 
p,abpw and an increase in producer surplus of pwefpr. However the overall welfare loss 
of the tariff effect barrier is now the larger area abef, which is greater than the tariff loss 
by the uncollected tariff revenue area acdf. 
Similarly, consider a quotaeffect barrier resulting from SPS regulation that restricts the 
quantity of imports, again constructed to result in the same level of imports of a constant 
quality. An example is an unnecessarily intrusive examination of each import shipment 
to see if it meets the domestic standard, which results in a significant backlog of imports 
and a decrease in their quantity. If the testing does not increase foreign costs, successful 
importers can gain positive profits from the supply restriction. In this case, there is no 
sale of import quotas by government and the welfare losses are again greater than in the 
non-SPS quota case. The two classes of SPS NTB are still equivalent when one considers 
only their quantity effect. 
The SPS case has an unambiguously lower domestic welfare by the area acdf than the 
classic tariff/quota case. This difference represents the additional cost incurred by the 
foreign producers to comply with the SPS regulation (Hillman, 1991) or the effects of a 
quota like barrier to foreign products. Thus, an asymmetric cost increase for foreign 
exporters is evidence of an additional domestic welfare loss from an NTB arising from 
SPS regulation. Welfare analysis of SPS NTl3 requires a comparative analysis that focuses 
on the actual effects of the regime.2 
Rodriguez (1979) and Baldwin (1984) discuss a further consideration in distinguishing 
the results of tariffeffect barriers based on whether the cost increase acts more like an 
Other transaction costs such as monitoring, surveillance, information gathering, and administration costs can 
also be raised or lowered by an SPS regime (Ndayisenga and Kinsey, 1994). 
* SimiIar suggestions are made by Sumner and Lee (1997) who present an equilibrium displacement model 
adapted to consider SPS NTBs. 
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ad valorem tariff, a specific tariff, or a composite of the two. An ad valorem tariff based 
on the final price of the good does not discriminate between quality levels because it is 
an equal mark-up for goods of all forms. Conversely, a specific tariff (or composite with 
a significant specific component) is more like a quota-effect barrier, with a bias toward 
higher quality imports. Other SPS regulations can have an effect more like a quantitative 
restriction or quota. With a quota effect barrier, increases above the minimum standards 
may occur in some or all of the quality attributes (e.g., safety), while the quantity traded 
remains at the quota-effect level. Therefore analysis of SPS regulation must examine 
both quantity and quality changes. 
The equivalence of tariffs and quotas, or their more complex SPS regime counterparts, 
has been shown not to hold in several circumstances. These include: when there is an 
imperfectly competitive market structure for either the foreign or domestic firms; 
certain general equilibrium conditions exist relating to the elasticity of the foreign trade 
offer curve apply; the allocation process for the quotas (or queuing system for the quota- 
effect regime) is not perfectly competitive; quality is modelled in the form of product 
attributes contributing to the total services supplied by the goods; some form of market 
uncertainty exists; or trading partners retaliate in response to the imposition of tariffs or 
quotas in differing manners (e.g., if other countries cannot distinguish the trade effect 
of national-level quality regulation quickly enough). Each of these conditions occur to 
some degree in most international markets for SPS attributes. A policy level test that 
focuses on relative compliance costs offers a road map for attacking this complexity. 
4. Incorporating Rapprochement Levels into the Analysis of SPS NTBs 
Recall that under current trade agreements the level of regulatory rapprochement reached 
by trading partners or world standards bodies has an important impact on whether an SPS 
regime will be considered to be an illegitimate NTB and on how disputes will be managed. 
Under the G A m  SPS Agreement, for example, for the science level test the Codex, IPPC, 
and OIE are recognised as the premier standard setting bodies to be referred to in judging 
a country’s SPS regime. For the policy level test, rapprochement, or lack thereof, has very 
direct impacts on trade flows and relative compliance costs. Under weaker forms of 
rapprochement, trade flows are in imperfectly substitutable goods. At the coordination 
level of rapprochement, trade may be one way or intra-industry trade (IIT) depending 
upon relative SPS standards. In comparison, stronger forms of rapprochement such as 
mutual recognition and harmonization usually facilitate IIT. 
First, consider the coordination level of rapprochement. A four country (Cl-C,) 
example is shown in Figure 3 to highlight likely trade flows. One-way trade is feasible 
from the high standard (qH) countries (C, and C,) to the low standard (qL) countries 
(C3 and C4). An SPS NTB is likely to block trade in the reverse direction. IIT can occur 
between countries with similar standards, for example between C ,  and C, or C3 and C,. 
Co-ordination rapprochement efforts often attempt gradually to reduce the differences 
between national-level standards. An example would be movement toward adoption and 
implementation of a similar Codex-based food safety standard. How this occurs has 
important effects on changes in food quality. For example, differences between 
Evaluating Non-Tang Barriers to T r d :  Phytosanitasy Regulation 243 
F v  3 The Impacts of Rapprochement Effod on ' h d e  Flow and Standards 
Co-ordination Mutual Recognition 
* 4  
Harmonisation 
Cl - c2 Harmonisation can occur 
at any standard level: 
q H  q M  q' - - c4 c3 
The arrows suggest the trade flows with the larger arrows indicating the dominant direction of trade. 
countries, such as C1 and C4 could be narrowed by the countries adopting new SPS 
standards of qH' < qH and q c  > qL. While this is likely to affect costs and possibly trade 
volumes, the pattern is Iikely to be maintained with product only moving from the high 
to low standard country. Indeed this trade may be facilitated by a reduction in 
compliance costs for C, due to qH' < qH. Why would a low standard country engage in 
this standard increasing activity if it has no export benefit? It may wish to increase the 
SPS standard for its direct domestic (e.g., public health) benefits and to better satisfy 
domestic consumer demand for product variety. In addition, a longer-run dynamic of 
sequential strengthening of rapprochement efforts may be at work. Low standard 
countries may demonstrate their intent to strengthen food controls as a first step that 
would eventually allow them to sell in high standard countries. 
In contrast, mutual recognition, for example as applied within the EU for certain 
product attributes, promotes trade regardless of the quality standards in the source 
country. The predominant direction of this trade (the larger arrows in Figure 3) based 
on production costs is from countries with low standards to those with high standards. A 
change in SPS standards may affect the volume of imports and exports. However, 
compared to co-ordination, mutual recognition offers more opportunity for IIT. 
Harmonisation efforts are more difficult to characterise. Three scenarios address the 
range of likely cases when countries move from weaker forms of rapprochement to 
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harmonisation.’ One case has an escalation of standards to the highest level observed 
before harmonisation (qH), while another has a reduction in standards to the lowest 
common denominator (qL),  possibly as a result of competitive deregulation. Each of 
these scenarios facilitates IIT’ compared to the pre-harmonisation scenario. It is also 
possible to consider a generalised case where a medium level of the SPS standard (e.g., 
q H  > q M  > qL)  is chosen, also with an increased potential for IIT. However this requires 
all countries to change their standards. In practice, with multiple countries there are 
likely to be a range of standards from Iow to high greatly increasing the number of 
potential rapprochement strategies. 
A clear characterisation of the level of rapprochement between trading partners is 
essential to the policy level analysis of SPS regimes as NTBs because of its impacts on 
costs. Because firms are concerned with all aspects of a product’s quality, a strong level 
of rapprochement for a limited range of quality attributes may not facilitate trade if i t  
does not address key differences in national-level regulations and enforcement. The 
actual level of rapprochement may be defined as the minimum of all the regulatory 
rapprochement efforts applied to each of the attribute subsets for a product. Given the 
historically weaker levels of regulatory and enforcement rapprochement accomplished 
for SPS attributes. the overall rapprochement environment will most often be 
constrained by the level attained in the SPS component of a trade agreement or 
relationship. 
The operationalisation and measurement of rapprochement levels in empirical 
research is in its infancy. Studies of factors influencing trade patterns tend to include the 
rapprochement level as a dummy variable representing membership in a trading bloc or 
‘similarity’ between countries (Hooker and Caswell, 1996, see chapters in Henneberry, 
1997). This approach is too rudimentary for use in analysing SPS regimes as NTBs. As a 
first step in this analysis, the rapprochement level can be operationalised as a continuous 
scale from 0 to 1, with 0 representing no rapprochement and 1 representing full 
harmonisation. Compliance cost differentials between domestic and foreign firms under 
SPS regimes can then be used to measure the degree of regulatory rapprochement. 
Recall that the tariffication or cost effect associated with an SPS NTB is proportional to 
the domestic welfare loss. The compliance cost (CC) differential therefore links the 
conceptual notion of a tariffication effect to the institutional structure of rapprochement 
efforts. 
All else equal, cost differentials are theoretically zero for harmonisation, the strongest 
level of rapprochement. Policy level analysis of SPS regimes would be unnecessary 
because disputes would not arise. For other SPS regimes, a simple proxy measure of the 
level of rapprochement is the ratio of compliance costs between foreign and domestic 
suppliers: 
CCD CCR +- 
CCF 
’ Other scenarios are possible with the resulting standards below q L  to promote trade via cost reductions or 
above qH to use rapprochement to stimulate increases in the SPS standard. 
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where CCR is the compliance cost ratio, CCD is the compliance cost for domestic 
suppliers, and CCF is the compliance cost for foreign suppliers. In the policy test of SPS 
as NTBs, the analysis would normally involve cases where CCF 2 CCD. The smaller the 
CCR the larger the differential in compliance costs between domestic and foreign 
suppliers. The CCR is a direct first tool to be used in the policy test to determine if an 
SPS regime is an illegitimate NTB. The smaller the CCR the more likely the SPS regime 
is illegitimate. How large a differential is necessary to generate a trade dispute depends 
on the trade flow. Small differentials in larger markets generate more disputes than large 
differentials in smaller markets. 
The existence of a CC differential is a tool to be used in a policy level test of SPS regimes 
as illegitimate NTBs. However, even where SPS regimes do not discriminate against 
foreign suppliers, compliance costs may not be identical across countries because factors 
such as economies of scale, capital investment, labour costs, and location specific costs 
differ. The CCR measure should be used net of such differences. Interestingly, this 
measure focuses on cases where CCD < CCF due to protection afforded by an SPS NTB. 
This is the opposite of the analysis for dumping or countervailing duties where measures 
analogous to CCD > CCF are evidence of subsidies or other forms of preferential 
treatment given to producers by their government for foreign sales. 
5. Conclusion 
Under recent trade agreements, a two part test is used to evaluate whether an SPS 
regulatory regime is an illegitimate non-tariff barrier to trade. The science part of the 
test is more clear cut in that an SPS standard will pass the test if it conforms to 
international standards or the counky can provide an acceptable risk assessment to 
support it. If the science test is passed, the analysis moves on to the less clear cut policy 
test. This test focuses on the choice, of regulatory regimes that achieve the SPS goal while 
having the smallest impact on international trade. 
We argue that operationalising the policy test requires analysis of how the SPS regime 
affects trade flows through differences in compliance costs, which in turn depend on the 
level of regulatory rapprochement between trading partners. This type of policy test is 
useful in two areas of trade facilitation and management. First, a country’s initial selection 
among alternative risk management strategies to meet SPS goals should incorporate 
consideration of the potential compiiance cost differentials it may generate. Under current 
agreements, nations are responsible for jointly considering the domestic and foreign 
impacts of SPS measures but have little guidance on how to coordinate the science and 
policy tests of their regulatory choices. Second, where disputes arise over the legitimacy of 
an SPS regime a clear measure of differential compliance costs plays an important role in 
evaluating whether the regime is an illegitimate non-tariff barrier to trade. 
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